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Abstract
This paper gives an analysis of the transitory phase of regulation
between the introduction of regulation and the reaching of an equilib-
rium. Four instruments, absolute and relative standards and permit
and credit trading are discussed and both the scenario where the stan-
dards are adjusted in every time period and where the are set at their
long-run level are considered under both perfect and imperfect com-
petition. It is shown that environmental regulation can lead to high
and persistent volatility in the markets, especially under credit trad-
ing and relative standards and when standards are adjusted regularly.
Volatility is also more likely under imperfect than under perfect com-
petition. Setting a constant standard may lead to a longer transitory
phase.
1 Introduction
In modelling environmental regulation, it is usually assumed that ﬁrms and
the industry as a whole adjust instantaneously to the new regulation and
move to the new equilibrium. The transitory phase is not modelled and it
is implicitly assumed that the path to the new equilibrium is a smooth one.
The fact that this phase is not modelled could be interpreted as implying
that this path is not important and that the transitory phase is just that,
something that will go away. The new equilibrium will arise and it is this
outcome we are interested in.
2However, the transitory phase is of importance and needs more attention.
If the path to the new equilibrium is rather volatile, ﬁrms will incur costs
from the uncertainty that surrounds them. Prices observed now need not
be a good prediction of prices in the future. Hence, the eﬃciency of an
instrument also depends on how fast and how smooth it gets the industry
from no regulation to the new equilibrium with regulation. That is, if the
industry reaches the new equilibrium at all. It is possible that the path
embarked on with the implementation of regulation is so volatile that the
industry never settles down in an equilibrium.
This paper explicitly models the transitory phase for four instruments,
absolute standards, relative standards, credit trading and permit trading, in
both a perfectly and an imperfectly competitive industry. For that purpose,
a dynamic model is developed in which ﬁrms can enter or exit the market,
depending on the proﬁtability of the incumbent ﬁrms. Two scenarios are
analyzed. In the ﬁrst scenario, the standard that will hold in the equilib-
rium with regulation is set from the ﬁrst period. In the second scenario,
environmental policy is revised in every period according to the situation in
the previous period. Relative standards are deﬁned as allowed emissions per
unit of output. Since total output can change in every period, the standard
has to be adjusted to realize the emission target. The same holds for credit
trading since this form of emissions trading is based on relative standards.
With absolute standards, the quantity of allowed emissions per ﬁrm will have
to be adjusted with entry or exit. For emissions trading, no such adjustment
is needed, since there exists a ceiling on total emissions which is realized in
every period.
This paper builds on work by Dijkstra (1999) and Boom and Dijkstra
(2006). Dijkstra (1999) analyzes the eﬀect of diﬀerent instruments on a
perfectly competitive industry, given that the government wants to achieve a
certain abatement level. He shows that diﬀerent instruments have diﬀerent
impacts on the industry, with relative standards leading to the highest output
level and permit trading with grandfathering leading to the highest proﬁts.
These results clearly have implications for the political acceptability of the
diﬀerent instruments. Boom and Dijkstra (2006) gives a model of permit and
credit trading, analyzing both perfect and imperfect competition (see also
Fischer 2001 and Gielen et al. 2002). Boom and Dijkstra (2006) shows that
the two types of emissions trading have diﬀerent impacts on the industry.
The speciﬁc model used in Boom and Dijkstra (2006) is also used in this
paper.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the model is
developed. Sections 3 and 4) present the regulation scenarios and simulation
results for perfect, respectively imperfect competition. Several cases are given
3to illustrate the eﬀect of regulation on the industry. In Section 5 some general
conclusions are given.
2 The Model
Consider an industry, consisting of n ﬁrms that produce a homogeneous good.
Production per ﬁrm is given by q and the price of the good is p. In producing
the good, ﬁrms emit a pollutant E, which the government wants to regulate.
The overall goal of the government is to limit total emissions to the level L.
Firm costs are given by
C(q, E) = aq2 + b(q − E)2 + K (1)
Here, a and b are parameters and K gives ﬁxed costs, with a, b,K > 0.
For this cost function, it holds that Cq > 0, Cqq > 0, CE < 0, CEE > 0,
CqE = CEq < 0.
The inverse demand function is linear and is given by
p = α− βnq (2)
with α, β > 0.
In the following, I will analyze the eﬀect of four forms of environmental
regulation on the industry; permit trading, credit trading, relative standards
and absolute standards. Under permit trading, the government divides the
total emission ceiling in permits and distributes these over the polluters, ei-
ther by grandfathering or auctioning, after which the polluters can trade the
permits. With credit trading, the government sets a relative standard that
limits emissions per unit of output. Firms that can stay below this relative
standard can sell credits. Absolute standards set a ceiling on emissions per
ﬁrm. I will ﬁrst discuss the case when there is perfect competition, and then
when there is imperfect competition in the industry. In both cases, the neces-
sary models are developed after which they are used to generate simulations
that show the functioning of the instruments under diﬀerent circumstances.
We analyze two forms of government behavior; myopic behavior and per-
fect foresight. With perfect foresight, the government knows the optimal
long-run standard under credit trading and relative and absolute standards.
The government then implements this long-run standard from the start.
With permit trading, the government does not set a standard, so here the
type of foresight of the government does not matter. With myopic behav-
ior, the government sets its policy in each period based on information from
the previous period. Hence, with absolute standards, the government sets
4the limit on emissions per ﬁrm at time t, E¯t, by dividing the limit on total
emissions by the number of ﬁrms in the previous period:
E¯t = L/nt−1 (3)
With permit trading, there are two possibilities. One possibility is that the
government hands out permits every period to ﬁrms that produced output
in the previous period, so that E¯t is given by (3). This implies that new
entrants will have to buy their way into the market. Firms that exit sell
their permits and cease to exist, where exiting ﬁrms are deﬁned as those that
set output equal to zero. Alternatively, the government could auction the
permits at the beginning of every new period. Both ways of distributing will
give the same outcome in the model. With perfect foresight, the government
sets the long run equilibrium values of the diﬀerent instruments from the
start of the regulation program. Combined trading does not alter the way
the government sets its policy.
With relative standards and credit trading, the relative standard is given
by the emission limit divided by total output in the previous period:
e¯t = L/(nt−1qt−1) (4)
Although an equilibrium can be derived, especially under perfect com-
petition (see Boom and Dijkstra (2006)), exit and entry of ﬁrms is used to
create dynamics in the system. Exit and entry are modelled similarly, but
slightly diﬀerently under perfect and imperfect competition. In both cases,
entry (exit) occurs in period t when there are positive (negative) proﬁts in
period t − 1. Then for perfect competition, let the number of ﬁrms in the
sector at period t be
nt = nt−1 + γ
(
Qt−1
qmint−1
− nt−1
)
(5)
Here γ > 0 gives the rate of adjustment and qmin is the output level at which
a ﬁrm earns no proﬁt. That is, qmin is the level of output where marginal
costs are equal to average costs, where costs include both operating costs and
all costs of regulation. It should be noted that the qmin calculated in this way
does not necessarily give the long-run output level. It gives the lowest cost
output level taking present regulation as given. Speciﬁcally, in calculating
qmin, the absolute or relative standards are taken as given or the permit
price (both under permit trading and combined trading) is taken as given.
If present regulation is not at its long-run equilibrium level, then neither will
qmin be.
5Using (5) implies that entry will happen when proﬁts are positive, while
there will be exit when proﬁts in the industry are negative. To see this, note
that when ﬁrms make a proﬁt, their output is higher than qmin. Equation (5)
says that ﬁrms will enter (exit) when output per ﬁrm is higher (lower) than
qmin. Using (5) has the advantage that it can be readily seen how fast ﬁrms
adjust. So when γ = 1, ﬁrms adjust fully in the sense that if policy does not
change, entry or exit will be such that, in the next period, proﬁts are zero
in the industry. Setting 0 < γ < 1 then gives slower than full adjustment,
while γ > 1 gives more than full adjustment (or over-adjustment).
The number of ﬁrms in the industry is an integer. However, (5) does not
necessarily give an integer. To deal with this problem, the number of ﬁrms
found through the use of (5) is rounded down to the nearest integer.
In the dynamic model of oligopoly, presented in section 4, ﬁrms take the
output of their competitors as given. More speciﬁcally, they assume that
the output levels of their rivals will be the same as they were in the previous
period. Furthermore, the government sets the relative and absolute standards
in the myopic manner as described above under perfect competition. This
will be compared with the case were the long-run equilibrium value of the
standards is set from the beginning. Under perfect competition the number
of ﬁrms was assumed to change as a function of proﬁt in the previous period.
A similar method was employed under imperfect competition. We assume
that ﬁrms determine how many ﬁrms there can be in the current period.
Then entry or exit occurs in the next period up to the level that could have
been sustained in the previous period. This is exactly the same as what
happens under perfect competition with γ = 1.
3 Perfect Competition
In this section, the transition from a state without regulation of emissions to
a new state with restrictions on emissions is simulated in the case of perfect
competition. In subsection 3.1 the discrete time model is given for the various
types of regulation. In subsection 3.2, the simulation results of the transition
phase are presented and discussed.
3.1 Regulation scenarios
No Regulation. The situation without regulation is the starting point of
the analysis and gives a benchmark for the changes caused by regulation. We
will assume that the industry is in long-run equilibrium before regulation is
6introduced. In this case, proﬁts for a ﬁrm are, from (1):
π = pq − C(q, E) = pq − aq2 − b(q − E)2 −K
The ﬁrst order conditions for proﬁt maximization are
∂π
∂q
= p− 2aq − 2b(q − E) = 0 (6)
∂π
∂E
= 2b(q − E) = 0 ⇒ q = E (7)
Besides these conditions, in the long run it must hold that pq = C(q, E), i.e.,
there should be no proﬁts:
2aq + 2b(q − E) = aq
2 + b(q − E)2 + K
q
Using (7) we ﬁnd
q =
√
K
a
To ﬁnd the market price of the good, insert this into (6) to ﬁnd:
p = 2a
√
K
a
The total number of ﬁrms is found by inserting the market price in (2) and
solving for n. This gives
n =
α
√
a
K
− 2a
β
The three equations for q, p and n fully determine the equilibrium in the no
regulation case.
Permit Trading. With permit trading, the government distributes the to-
tal limit on emissions as permits over the ﬁrms. Let E¯i ≥ 0 be the amount
of permits received by ﬁrm i. The maximization problem for the ﬁrm (sup-
pressing the i’s) is, from (1):
max
q,E
π = pq − C(q, E)−Rp(E − E¯)
= pq − aq2 − b(q − E)2 −K −Rp(E − E¯)
where Rp is the permit price. The ﬁrst order conditions are given by
∂π
∂q
= p− 2aq − 2b(q − E) = 0 (8)
7∂π
∂E
= 2b(q − E)−Rp = 0 (9)
In this case, with identical ﬁrms, emissions trading will equalize emissions
between ﬁrms in every period, i.e., E = L/n. Using this, and inserting for p
from the inverse demand function given in (2), we ﬁnd
q =
2bL
n
+ α
2a + 2b + nβ
(10)
In the long run, ﬁrms regulated through permit trading will have to cover
both their operating costs C(q, E) = aq2+b(q−E)2+K and the opportunity
costs of emissions RpE. That is, in the long run
π = pq − aq2 − b(q − E)2 −K −RpE ≥ 0 (11)
The reason for this is that if the ﬁrm does not cover the opportunity costs
on emissions, it would be better oﬀ closing down and selling the permits.
In the analysis, we use the minimum average costs level of output. This
output level is given as the q where π = 0 in (11). With permit trading, qmin
is found by setting long-run average costs, including the opportunity costs of
emissions, equal to marginal costs:
aq2 + b(q − E)2 + K + RpE
q
= 2aq + 2b(q − E) (12)
Using (9) to eliminate E and solving for q gives
qmin =
√
4bK −R2√
4ab
During every period then the number of ﬁrms is ﬁxed. Using this, q and
Q = nq can be found. From this, the price of the good can be derived using
(2).
Credit Trading and Relative Standards With relative standards, the
government sets a limit e¯ on the emissions per unit of output. The ﬁrm is
then allowed to emit e¯q in total. With credit trading, the ﬁrm is allowed
to sell credits if it can stay below the total allowed emission level for the
ﬁrm. Since we are dealing with identical ﬁrms in the model, no trade will
take place. Therefore, the analysis of credit trading and relative standards
becomes identical, except for the fact that under credit trading there is a
credit price Rc, while with relative standards, there is a shadow price. In the
following, I will concentrate on credit trading.
8Under regulation with credit trading, the ﬁrm will maximize, from (1):
π = pq − aq2 − C(q, E)−Rc(E − e¯q)
= pq − aq2 − b(q − E)2 −K −Rc(E − e¯q)
The ﬁrst order conditions for proﬁt maximization are
∂π
∂q
= p− 2aq − 2b(q − E) + Rce¯ = 0 (13)
∂π
∂E
= 2b(q − E)−Rc = 0 (14)
With identical ﬁrms there is no scope for trading, and all ﬁrms will emit up
to the allowed amount, i.e., E = e¯q. Using this, and inserting for p from (2)
we ﬁnd
q =
α
2a + 2b(e¯− 1)2 + nβ (15)
In this case, there are two variables that need to be determined, n and e¯.
As with permit trading, n is determined through (5) with qmin for relative
standards now given by
qmin =
√
K√
a + b(e¯− 1)2
and qmin for credit trading given by
qmin =
√
4bK −R2√
4ab
(16)
The two equations for qmin are found by setting long-run average costs equal
to marginal costs and then using (14) and (4) to eliminate E and R or e¯.
Absolute Standards With absolute standards, the government sets a limit
E¯ on emissions per ﬁrm. Since ﬁrms are identical in this model, the analysis of
absolute standards is rather similar to the analysis of permit trading above.
However, there is one diﬀerence in that the ﬁrm does not have to cover
opportunity costs of emissions. Hence, with absolute standards, it must hold
that
π = pq − aq2 − b(q − E¯)2 −K ≥ 0 (17)
It is clear that this is diﬀerent from the long-run proﬁt function for permit
trading given by (11). Otherwise, the ﬁrst order conditions derived for permit
9trading also hold under absolute standards, with the diﬀerence that Rp is
replaced by a shadow price λ.
This also implies that qmin for absolute standards is diﬀerent from the one
under permit trading. In this case, qmin found by setting long-run average
costs equal to marginal costs
qmin =
√
K + bE¯2√
a + b
Combined Trading The model can also be used to analyze the eﬀects of
combining permit and credit trading. With perfect competition, the only
interesting case is the one where two sectors operating on diﬀerent product
markets are connected through emissions trading. If two sectors, from dif-
ferent countries for example, operating on the same product market would
be connected through emissions trading, the sector regulated through permit
trading would vanish because of its higher marginal production costs.
In the following, we assume that the two sectors are identical in all as-
pects, except that they operate on two diﬀerent goods market, which have
the same demand function, and that one sector is regulated through permit
trading, while the other is regulated through credit trading. In the case of
combined trading, an additional condition is needed, given by
ncEc − ncqce¯c = npE¯p − npEp
where the superscripts c and p denote the credit and permit sectors respec-
tively. This condition merely says that total emissions should be equal to
total allowable emissions. Using this condition, together with the ﬁrst order
conditions for proﬁt maximization for both sectors given in (8), (9), (13) and
(14) and inverse demand function (2), the price of emission quotas can be
determined as
R =
{
−2b (4a2npE¯ + ncnpβ[(e¯− 2)α + npE¯β)
+2a
(
np
(
npE¯β − α)+ nc ((e¯− 1)α + npE¯β))]
}
/{
4a2 (nc + np) + ncnpβ
(
2b
(
2− 2e¯ + e¯2)+ (nc + np) β)
+2a
(
2b
(
np + nc (e¯− 1)2)+ (nc + np)2 β)
}
The quota price can then be used directly in the ﬁrst order conditions to
calculate qc and qp and the other variables.
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Figure 1: Perfect Competition, Myopic Government, Inelastic Demand
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The output of a ﬁrm in the permit sector is given by
qp =
α−R
2a + βn
The output of a ﬁrm in the credit sector is
qc =
α−R(1− e¯)
2a + βn
Emissions in both cases are given by
E = q − R
2b
Also qmin changes for both cases. More precisely, qmin becomes identical for
the two cases (see Boom and Dijkstra (2006))
qmin = qmin =
√
4bK −R2√
4ab
The equations for emission quota price, output, emissions and zero proﬁt
output together with demand function (2), fully characterize the equilibrium
in the combined system.
3.2 Simulation results
The results of the simulation1 for perfect competition are reported in Figures
1 through 10. We will ﬁrst discuss the case where the government behaves
myopically. The simulation results for this are given in Figures 1 through
4. Figure 1 gives some cases with inelastic demand. The price elasticity
of demand in the starting position without regulation is −0.5 in this case.
Figures 2, 3 and 4 give cases with elastic demand. The price elasticity of
demand in the starting position here is −1.25 for Figure 2 and −2 for Figures
3 and 4. Figures 5 through 7 give some of the same cases, but for combined
trading.
In all cases, the initial condition is the same, with qn = 1, En = 1, pn = 2
and nn = 100, where the superscript n denotes the no regulation case. Total
emissions without regulation are then 100 and in all cases, except the last case
in Figure 3, emissions are reduced by 30% giving a limit on total emissions
1The simulation algorithm was programmed in Fortran and is available
from the author upon request
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Figure 2: Perfect Competition, Myopic Government, Elastic Demand 1
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Figure 3: Perfect Competition, Myopic Government, Elastic Demand 2a
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Figure 4: Perfect Competition, Myopic Government, Elastic Demand 2b
a = 1, K = 1, α = 3, β = 0.01
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of 70. Environmental policy is introduced in period two. In all ﬁgures, the
dotted line gives output per ﬁrm, the drawn line gives price of output and
the dashed line gives the number of ﬁrms. The values in the ﬁgures give the
index relative to the no-regulation case.
In the following, we will concentrate on the dynamic eﬀects of regulation
and pay little attention to the comparative statics eﬀects. For the latter,
at least for permit and credit trading, the reader is referred to Boom and
Dijkstra (2006). One important aspect however is entry and exit of ﬁrms.
Environmental regulation diminishes the eﬃcient scale of operation of the
ﬁrm. Whether environmental regulation then leads to entry or exit depends
on the elasticity of demand. If demand is rather inelastic, total output will
not change by much as a result of environmental regulation and ﬁrms will
enter. When demand is elastic, total output will decrease by a large amount,
and ﬁrms will exit.
A number of interesting features are shown in the ﬁgures. First of all,
the transition from no regulation to regulation is often not very smooth,
but may be rather volatile, especially with credit trading. Secondly, in most
cases, credit trading (or relative standards) leads to less change in the long-
run equilibrium than permit trading and absolute standards do. This was
already shown in Boom and Dijkstra (2006). Thirdly, immediately setting
the standard (relative or absolute) at its long-run equilibrium level may lead
15
Figure 5: Perfect Competition, Myopic Government, Combined Trading,
Inelastic Demand
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to a longer transition period than myopic behavior by the government.
We start with the volatility in the market caused by regulation. As the
ﬁgures show, there are basically two types of volatility. The ﬁrst one is very
short lived: the introduction of regulation can lead to a strong reaction in
the ﬁrst periods, whereafter the system more or less smoothly moves to the
new equilibrium. This is clear in many of the cases, also when the optimal
long-run standards are set from the ﬁrst period onward.
The second type of volatility is of a more persistent nature, though only
credit trading (relative standards) is prone to this type of volatility. Whether
the system becomes volatile depends on several factors, such as the elasticity
of demand, marginal costs of abatement, the rate of adjustment by ﬁrms
(given by γ), and government policy. As is clear from a comparison of the
ﬁgures, there is more volatility with credit trading when demand is elastic
and when marginal abatement costs are high. The clearest case is given
in Figure 3. Here permit trading and absolute standards give a more or
less smooth transition path after the initial shock. However, with credit
trading, the system becomes more volatile the higher marginal abatement
costs become. For b = 2, γ = 1, credit trading shows a rather smooth
path with little divergence from the no regulation case. However, when b
becomes larger, the system shows two-period bifurcation (b = 10, γ = 1)
and four-period bifurcation (b = 12.75, γ = 1). Putting more strain on the
system by setting a lower total ceiling makes the system become chaotic
(b = 11, L = 30, γ = 1). Hence, in these cases, the system never reaches
an equilibrium. Unfortunately, the model could not be solved for very high
elasticity of demand and high marginal abatement costs. However, the higher
marginal abatement costs, the more volatile the system also becomes here.
Chaos can arise when there is a non-linear relationship between a variable
in a certain period and the same variable in the previous period (see Baumol
and Benhabib 1989 and Shone 2002, Ch.7). In our model, there are two
relationships that make a connection between the current and the previous
value of a variable: the entry/exit condition given in (5) and government
policy as given by how the standards are set (equations (3) and (4)). A glance
at (5) shows that the entry/exit rule gives a linear relationship between the
current and the previous number of ﬁrms, so that this cannot be the cause
of chaos in the model. For government policy, the relationship is diﬀerent
between credit trading (and relative standards) on the one hand and absolute
standards and permit trading on the other hand. For credit trading with
myopic standard setting we ﬁnd from (15) and (4)
e¯t =
β
α
L +
2L
(
a + b (e¯t−1 − 1)2
)
αnt−1
(18)
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while for permit trading (if they are grandfathered) and absolute standards
we ﬁnd from (10) and (3)
E¯t =
L
nt−1
(
1 + γ
(
qt−1
qmint−1
− 1
)) (19)
Equation (18) shows that under myopic standard setting there is a nonlinear
relationship between the current and previous relative standard, while (19)
shows that there is a linear relationship for absolute standards and permit
trading. Hence, only with credit trading and myopic setting of the rela-
tive standard the system can become chaotic. Whether there will be chaos
under credit trading (and relative standards) depends on the values of the
parameters, which is also clear from the ﬁgures.
The more elastic demand is, the more output will decrease as a result of
the introduction of a given level of environmental regulation. With relative
standards, this can lead to volatility as was mentioned above. Since the
government is myopic, it sets the initial relative standard too strict. Firms
react by reducing output by more than would be necessary to meet the
overall emission limit. Then, in the next period, the government sets a too
lax standard since it sets the standard based on output in the ﬁrst period
after regulation, leading to too high output. The higher the elasticity of
demand, the larger the swings in output will be. But then, the government
will also set a standard that is further from the correct standard in the initial
periods. These eﬀects are magniﬁed with higher marginal abatement costs,
since the higher marginal abatement costs are, the larger the reduction in
output as a result of environmental regulation. As the ﬁgures show, these
eﬀects can reinforce each other such that the volatility becomes permanent,
and even leads to chaos. It has to be noted though, that chaos is only found
at rather extreme values of some of the parameters. Hence, in Figure 2, chaos
is found with price elasticity of demand equal to −2 at the starting point
and 70% emission reduction.
Entry and exit of ﬁrms leads to a movement in the opposite direction
from the one following from the shifts in environmental regulation with a
myopic regulator. With inelastic demand, higher speed γ of adjustment by
ﬁrms then leads to higher volatility under credit trading, while with elastic
demand, it dampens the volatility caused by shifts in the relative standard.
For inelastic demand, we give cases with γ = 0 (no entry or exit) and γ = 2
in the last two boxes of Figure 1. With γ = 0, volatility gradually decreases.
However, with γ = 2 there is high volatility under relative standards. This
is a result of the high levels of entry and exit by ﬁrms. Figures 2 and 4 show
that under credit trading and elastic demand volatility is high when there
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is no entry and exit (γ = 0). The higher the speed of entry, the lower the
volatility subsequently becomes. To see why this is, start at period two where
environmental policy is introduced. The government sets a relative standard
based on the output level without environmental regulation. One of the
results is that output decreases, and hence, the standard was set too tight.
At the same time, proﬁts are negative. Then in period three the government
will calculate the relative standard anew, but will now set it too lax since
output was very low in the ﬁrst period with regulation. This will lead to a
higher output level in period three. Without exit or entry, this would lead
to a higher than optimal total output level. However, because proﬁts were
negative in period two, ﬁrms will exit in period three and hence total output
will not increase by as much as it would have done if the number of ﬁrms
was ﬁxed. Hence, the exit of ﬁrms dampens the volatility in the system.
Combining the permit and credit trading in general gives a more smooth
transition. A higher speed of entry and exit under combined trading always
leads to more volatility as the last boxes in Figures 4 through 6 show.
We now turn to the case where the government sets the long-run equilib-
rium standards from the start. The results are given in Figures 8 through
10. For permit trading, the case where policy is set optimally from the start
is identical to the myopic case, therefore, in Figures 8 through 10 we only
give the trajectories for credit trading and absolute standards. The result
is that setting a constant standard will give a smooth transition to the new
equilibrium, but may lead to a longer transition period than setting a new
standard in every period. Again, the result is dependent on the elasticity
of demand. Comparing Figure 1 and Figure 8, it is clear that setting a
ﬁxed standard gets the system quicker to the new equilibrium. However, as
demand becomes more elastic, the diﬀerence becomes smaller. In the ﬁrst
case given in Figures 2 and 9, with b = 2, γ = 1, it takes 22 periods for
the industry under credit trading to reach equilibrium with both myopic and
constant standards. For absolute standards, it takes 54 periods with myopic
standards and 46 with ﬁxed standards in the same case. With b = 10, γ = 1
credit trading does not lead to a stable equilibrium, so nothing can be said
about the time it takes to reach the equilibrium. For absolute standards
however, it takes 136 periods to reach a stable equilibrium with myopic stan-
dards, and 133 periods with constant standards. Hence, in this case, myopic
and constant standards lead to virtually the same length of approach path to
the new stable equilibrium, if such an equilibrium exists. In the second case
with elastic demand, given in Figures 3 and 10, it takes longer to reach the
new stable equilibrium with constant standards than with myopic standards.
For example, with b = 2, γ = 1 it takes 30 periods for credit trading to reach
the new equilibrium with myopic standards, while it takes 36 periods with
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Figure 8: Perfect Competition, Constant Standards, Inelastic Demand
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constant standards. For absolute standards, it takes 69 periods with myopic
standards and 71 with constant standards. In the case with b = 12.75, γ = 1,
nothing can be said for credit trading because it does not lead to a a stable
equilibrium with myopic standards. However, for absolute standards it takes
210 periods to reach the equilibrium with myopic standards and 236 periods
with constant standards.
With constant standards, a high speed of entry and exit only leads to
more volatility under inelastic demand. The reason for this is that with in-
elastic demand, total output at ﬁrst decreases by too much when the optimal
standard is set from the start, while with elastic demand, the market adjusts
more gradually. With inelastic demand then, the initial spike is sustained
and sometimes ampliﬁed by entry and exit.
Unfortunately, the model could not be solved for combined trading and
constant standards. Therefore, no results for combined trading with constant
standards are reported.
4 Imperfect competition
In this section, we give the case with oligopoly. In subsection 4.1 the discrete
time model is given for the various types of regulation. In subsection 4.2, the
simulation results of the transition phase are presented and discussed.
4.1 Regulation scenarios
No Regulation The no-regulation case is used as a starting point for the
analysis and as a benchmark to measure changes against. We are therefore
only interested in the long-run equilibrium, so no dynamics are incorporated
in this stage. Assuming that all ﬁrms are identical and keeping the cost
function (1), proﬁts are given by
πi = p(Q)qi − aq2i − b(qi − Ei)2 −K
where Q =
∑n
i=1 qi. Using the demand function (2), the ﬁrst order conditions
are
∂πi
∂qi
= α− βQ− βqi − 2aqi − 2b(qi − Ei) = 0
∂πi
∂Ei
= 2b(qi − Ei) = 0 ⇒ qi = Ei
With imperfect competition, ﬁrms can earn a proﬁt, even in the long run.
However, the number of ﬁrms need not be constant over time. The long-run
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Figure 10: Perfect Competition, Constant Standards, Elastic Demand 2
a = 1, K = 1, α = 3, β = 0.01
b = 2, γ = 1
5 10 15 20 25 30
t
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
index Credit Trading
5 10 15 20 25 30
t
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
index Absolute Standards
b = 12.75, γ = 1
5 10 15 20 25 30
t
70
80
90
100
110
120
index Credit Trading
5 10 15 20 25 30
t
70
80
90
100
110
120
index Absolute Standards
b = 12.75, γ = 0
5 10 15 20 25 30
t
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
index Credit Trading
5 10 15 20 25 30
t
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
index Absolute Standards
b = 12.75, γ = 2
5 10 15 20 25 30
t
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
index Credit Trading
5 10 15 20 25 30
t
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
index Absolute Standards
q n p
25
equilibrium conditions with imperfect competition are that all ﬁrms in the
market should at least cover their costs, i.e., Πi ≥ 0 and that entry should
not be proﬁtable. Thus:
πi(n
∗) ≥ 0 and πi(n∗ + 1) < 0
where n∗ is the equilibrium number of ﬁrms in the market. The equilibrium
output level per ﬁrm is then given by
qi =
α
2a + (1 + n∗)β
Permit Trading With permit trading, the government puts a limit L on
total emissions, giving an initial distribution of permits per ﬁrm of E¯ = L/n.
The proﬁt function for the ﬁrm then becomes:
π = p(Q)qi − aq2i − b(qi − Ei)2 −K −Rp(Ei − E¯)
Firm i assumes that Q−i,t = Q−i,t−1, where
Q−i =
n∑
j=1,j =i
qj
The ﬁrst order conditions for proﬁt maximization are
∂π
∂qi
= α− β(qi + Q−i,t−1)− βqi − 2aqi − 2b(qi − Ei) = 0 (20)
∂π
∂Ei
= 2b(qi − Ei)−Rp = 0
Since we have assumed that ﬁrms are identical, emissions after trading will
be Ei = L/n. Solving for qi from (20) gives
qi =
2b(L/n) + α− βQ−i,t−1
2 (a + b + β)
Also under imperfect competition a ﬁrm regulated through permit trading
must cover the opportunity costs of emissions. Therefore, it must hold that
πi = p(qi + Q−i,t−1)qi − aq2i − b(qi − Ei)2 −K −RpEi ≥ 0
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The equilibrium number of ﬁrms in the market, n∗ is the smallest number
of ﬁrms for which it holds that
∑n∗+1
i=1 πi < 0. This is found iteratively. Hence,
in the model, the number of ﬁrms in every period is increased from 2 to the
number where proﬁts are lower than zero. Then the number of ﬁrms in the
market is the latter number of ﬁrms minus 1.
Credit Trading and Relative Standards Also here, the analysis of credit
trading and relative standards is identical. Therefore, I concentrate on credit
trading. With credit trading, the proﬁts of a ﬁrm become
πi = p(Q)qi − aq2i − b(qi − Ei)2 −K −Rc(Ei − e¯qi)
where e¯ = L/Qt−1. Firm i assumes that Q−i,t = Q−i,t−1, so that the ﬁrst
order conditions for proﬁt maximization are
∂πi
∂qi
= α− β(qi + Q−i,t−1)− βqi − 2aqi − 2b(qi − Ei) + Rce¯ = 0
∂πi
∂Ei
= 2b(qi − Ei)−Rc = 0
The output level of ﬁrm i in period t is then given by
qi =
α− βQ−i,t−1
2
(
a + b (e¯− 1)2 + β)
Also under credit trading, the number of ﬁrms in the market is found
through iteration.
Absolute Standards The analysis of absolute standards is identical to the
one of permit trading except for two points. In the ﬁrst place, there is no
market for quotas, so there is no permit price under absolute standards. This
means that Rp should be replaced with a shadow price λ. Secondly, under
absolute standards, the ﬁrm does not have to cover the opportunity costs of
emissions. Hence, the proﬁt condition becomes
πi = p(qi + Q−i,t−1)qi − aq2i − b(qi − Ei)2 −K ≥ 0
Combined Trading As with perfect competition, we can combine the two
systems. From the ﬁrst order conditions for permit and credit trading, we
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can derive for the emission level per ﬁrm
Epi =
− (Rp(a + b + β) + b (βQp−i,t−1 − α))
2b (a + β)
Eci =
− (Rc(a + b(1− e¯) + β) + b (Qc−i,t−1β − α))
2b (a + β)
Additionally, we need a condition on the total amount of emissions in both
systems and a condition that the emission quota price will be the same in
both segments of the market:
ncEc + npEp = npE¯p + ncqce¯c
Rp = Rc = R
Using these to solve for the price of emission quotas, we ﬁnd
R = −b
(
2anpE¯ + nc (e¯− 1) (α− βQc−i,t−1)+ np (βQp−i,t−1 − α + 2E¯β))
a (nc + np) + b
(
np + nc(e¯− 1)2)+ β (nc + np)
The emission quota price can then be used in the ﬁrst order conditions to
solve for qpi and q
c
i . These are given by
qpi =
α−R− βQp−i,t−1
2(a + β)
qci =
α + R(e¯− 1)− βQc−i,t−1
2(a + β)
4.2 Simulation results
Simulation results are reported in Figures 10-13. The ﬁrst three ﬁgures gives
some cases where the standards are set myopically. In Figure 12, permit and
credit trading are combined, while in Figure 13 the optimal long-run standard
is set from the onset of regulation. In all cases, the initial conditions under
no regulation are the same, with qn = 7.14, En = 7.14, pn = 21.43, nn = 4
and proﬁts of 2.04 in every period. Total emissions without regulation are
28.57 and the government wants to reduce this amount by 30%, leading to a
limit on emissions of L = 20. The ﬁgures show the index of output per ﬁrm
(dotted line), product price (drawn line) and the number of ﬁrms (dashed
line) where the no regulation inices are set to 100.
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Figure 11: Imperfect Competition, Myopic Government
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Figure 12: Imperfect Competition, Myopic Government
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Figure 13: Imperfect Competition, Myopic Government, Combined Trading
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In a sense, one would expect more volatility in a market with oligopoly
competition and Nash behavior than with perfect competition. The reason
is that under these circumstances, any change will lead to reactions by the
competitors. This is exacerbated by the assumption that ﬁrms set their
output depending on their competitors’ output in the previous period. This
introduces a new lagged variable that can cause volatility. On the other hand
however, changes in a oligopolistic market may be less pronounced and it is
less likely that there will be changes in all variables in every period. For
example, the number of ﬁrms may change as a result of the introduction of
environmental regulation, but such a change often only occurs once or at
most twice, at least under permit trading and absolute standards. This then
has a dampening eﬀect on the market.
These two forces, the one increasing volatility, the other decreasing it,
seem to compensate each other more or less since the general results of the
analysis under imperfect competition are rather similar to those under per-
fect competition. As with perfect competition, the market is more likely to
be volatile under credit trading than under permit trading. As Figure 10
shows, the system quickly comes to equilibrium under low levels of b. How-
ever, already with b = 0.8, the system seems to become chaotic under credit
trading. Interestingly, a higher b at ﬁrst leads to a more structured form of
volatility, whereafter the system becomes more chaotic again at b = 3.4. In
Figure 11, the case of b = 3.4 under credit trading is given again, but now for
a longer time period. It is clear from this ﬁgure, that there is high volatility,
but that there also is some sense of regularity in the system. In this case,
real chaotic behavior could not be produced. But then, the model could not
be solved for higher levels of b than 3.4.
Combining the two systems leads to some volatility in both the permit
and credit sector. However, the system always seems to go to an equilibrium.
Hence, the volatility of the credit trading scheme spills over to the permit
trading scheme, but eventually, the system eases down.
With imperfect competition, setting the standard at its long-run equilib-
rium value from the start leads to less volatility in the market at lower levels
of b as can be seen from the case with b = 0.8 in Figures 10 and 13. However,
at higher levels of b, the system becomes volatile again. This is a result from
the interplay between the entry and exit of ﬁrms and the way ﬁrms set their
production level. This shows that with imperfect competition, volatility can
be a persistent phenomena under credit trading, even when the government
sets a constant standard from the beginning of regulation. This in contrast
to perfect competition where setting a constant standard always leads to a
smooth adjustment to the new equilibrium, even with credit trading.
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Figure 14: Imperfect Competition, Constant Standards
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5 Conclusion
In the economic literature, the performance of instruments for environmental
regulation is mostly judged by their eﬃciency. Sometimes political, read
distributional, eﬀects are considered too. This paper takes into account that
the economic impacts during the transition period from no regulation to
the new equilibrium with regulation should be taken into account too. In
particular the volatility of output, which is an indicator of ﬂuctuations in
employment, the price consumers pay for output and the number of ﬁrms
since excessive entry and exit during the transition period are a waste the
policy maker would rather want to avoid.
In the model resented, regular adjustment of standards can lead to volatil-
ity in the regulated industry when the instrument used is relative standards
or credit trading. Such volatility is more likely to occur when demand is
elastic, abatement costs are high and the emission reduction goal is rather
ambitious. Swift entry and exit of ﬁrms increases the volatility with low elas-
ticity of demand, but mitigates the level of volatility with high elasticity of
demand. The volatility generated under credit trading in the dynamic model
is due to the fact that there is a non-linear relationship between the relative
standards in subsequent periods. With absolute standards, there is a linear
relationship, while with permit trading, the government does not adjust the
standard. The diﬀerences in how the standards are set explains why there is
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not much volatility with permit trading and constant standards, even when
the government reacts myopically.
Of the types of regulation discussed in this paper, constant relative stan-
dards are the conventional approach in the European Union (van der Laan
2002) and also in the USA. Frequent retrospective adjustment of standards
does not occur. The possibility that total emissions will end up above or
below the long run target is simply accepted. Absolute standards or emis-
sion ceilings are only applied by exception. In contrast, emissions trading in
various forms may have the future. Several programs of credit trading ex-
ist in the USA and the UK. The USA was also the ﬁrst in starting a permit
trading program for SO2 emissions. The EU has just launched a permit trad-
ing scheme for CO2 emissions. From the point of view of policy relevance,
a comparison of credit trading and permit trading programmes to assess
their performances during the transition stage from no regulation to the new
equilibrium with regulation in particular in terms of volatility therefore is in
place.
In all simulations of permit trading under perfect competition the num-
ber of ﬁrms and product price increases or decreases smoothly. Only output
per ﬁrm overshoots its long-run equilibrium in the ﬁrst periods after the
introduction of regulation, but subsequently adjusts smoothly. With imper-
fect competition the adjustment is generally somewhat less smoothly, but
basically the same as with perfect competition. With perfect competition
and constant standards, credit trading leads to an at least equally smooth
adjustment at with permit trading. However, with imperfect competition
credit trading can lead to volatility in the market, even when the standard
is set at its long-run optimal level from the start of the program.
These results suggest that under perfect competition diﬀerences in pains
of adjustment are not likely to play a role in the choice between credit and
permit trading or constant standards. Volatility would then only be a prob-
lem when the government uses credit trading and frequently adjusts the
underlying relative standard. However, with imperfect competition, credit
trading may lead to higher adjustment costs, even when the government does
not adjust the underlying relative standard. In that case, permit trading
would be the better choice.
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